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ABSTRACT. Groundwater is a common-pool resource that is subject to depletion in many places around the world as a result of
increased use of irrigation and water-demanding cash crops. Where state capacity to control groundwater use is limited, collective
action is important to increase recharge and restrict highly water-consumptive crops. We present results of field experiments in hard
rock areas of Andhra Pradesh, India, to examine factors affecting groundwater use. Two nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) ran
the games in communities where they were working to improve watershed and water management. Results indicate that, when the links
between crop choice and groundwater depletion is made explicit, farmers can act cooperatively to address this problem. Longer NGO
involvement in the villages was associated with more cooperative outcomes in the games. Individuals with more education and higher
perceived community social capital played more cooperatively, but neither gender nor method of payment had a significantly effect on
individual behavior. When participants could repeat the game with communication, similar crop choice patterns were observed. The
games provided an entry point for discussion on the understanding of communities of the interconnectedness of groundwater use and
crop choice.
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INTRODUCTION
Groundwater use is a pressing issue in global water management.
The key use of groundwater is irrigation, which uses 70% of global
freshwater withdrawals, of which 43% is from groundwater
(Siebert et al. 2010). Groundwater use for irrigation is increasing
in absolute and relative terms (Siebert et al. 2010).  
India is the world’s largest user of groundwater for agriculture
(Shah 2009). According to the Fourth Minor Irrigation Census
(2006–2007; http://micensus.gov.in/), the numbers of shallow tube
wells increased from 8.35 million to 9.12 million, and deep tube
wells increased from 0.53 million to 1.44 million, between 2000–
2001 and 2006–2007. Today, > 60% of the irrigation requirements
are met by groundwater, clearly indicating the increasing
dependence on wells for irrigation. When juxtaposed against the
fact that > 85% of the drinking water requirements in India are
met from groundwater (World Bank 2010), there is tremendous
pressure on groundwater resources in India. This is reflected in
the falling water table levels, indicated in premonsoon decadal
trends captured by the Central Ground Water Board (2013):
Approximately 50% of the wells tested showed a water table
decline, with 36.77% of wells showing a decline of 0–2 m below
ground level (bgl), and approximately 13% of wells showing a
decline of > 2 m bgl, from 2002 to 2012. Declines in water levels
in excess of 4 m bgl are prominent in the states of Rajasthan,
Punjab, Haryana, Delhi, and Andhra Pradesh. In total, 1494 of
4277 blocks (subdistrict administrative units) assessed, or ~26%,
fall into the categories of semicritical (using > 70% of net annual
groundwater availability), critical (using > 90%), or overexploited
(using > 100% of recharge); all of these categories have significant
long-term decline in pre- or postmonsoonal water levels.  
Groundwater is a common-pool resource: exploitation by one
user reduces groundwater availability for the rest of the users, but
it is very difficult to exclude users or limit their extraction,
provided they have the land and financing necessary for a well
and pump (Ostrom et al. 1999). Detection of free-riding behavior
is also typically a challenge because the resource is not directly
observable, and, unlike surface irrigation, users are not drawing
from a visible common channel but individually from a concealed
aquifer. Like users of many other common-pool resources,
farmers using groundwater in many places around the world face
a dilemma: they have to choose between short-term individual
gains from resource extraction and long-term sustainability of
the resource, especially in hard rock aquifers where recharge is
limited and highly water-consumptive crops are more profitable
than crops with low water consumption (Garduño et al. 2009).  
Many analysts emphasize the role of the state in controlling
groundwater exploitation (e.g., Ross and Martinez-Santos 2010
for Australia and Spain). However, state control requires a high
degree of state capacity to monitor groundwater levels and use
by many dispersed users. Bekkar et al. (2009) argue that state
action is necessary but insufficient for effective groundwater
management. Even where there is state capacity, additional
community efforts are often needed for effective groundwater
management (Mitchell et al. 2011).  
In India, the government has had limited capacity to regulate
groundwater use (Shah et al. 2012). The major state regulatory
measure focuses on blocks that have been declared to be using
too high a proportion of recharge by restricting the issuance of
electricity connections for pumps within a certain distance of
existing wells or by regulating the supply of electricity to wells.
However, farmers with electricity connections often receive flat
rate or highly subsidized rural electricity, which creates little
incentive to conserve water. The political economy of agriculture
in India has limited the implementation of these or other state
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measures to control groundwater (Mukerji and Shah 2005,
Mukherji 2006, Faysse and Petit 2012), and those who can
purchase diesel pumps can often get around the regulations.  
Collective institutions for self-regulation of resource use have
evolved to address such common-pool resource dilemmas in many
contexts, including surface irrigation, forests, and rangelands.
However, groundwater presents particular challenges to the
evolution of such commons management owing to the lack of
clear boundaries or visibility of the resource stocks and flows and
the difficulty of regulating the installation and use of wells on
individual land holdings. Ostrom’s (1965) dissertation examined
such institutions for groundwater governance in California, and
work by Blomquist (1992) and others has examined factors that
contribute to such arrangements.  
What can be done when such self-governance does not emerge?
As noted by the World Bank (2010:xvii), “While the ‘what-to-do’
elements of successful community action on groundwater
management are broadly known - actionable resource
information, social mobilization, and incentives to facilitate
change - there is a notable lack of proven models for community
based groundwater management.” One response has been to work
through nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to raise
awareness of the problems of groundwater overextraction and
ways of addressing them (Garduño et al. 2009). Methods can
include increasing groundwater recharge through management in
the upper catchment, but usually also need to include some form
of demand management to restrict withdrawals, usually through
forms of community groundwater budgeting or limitations on
types of crops grown or technologies for water extraction and
application (notably drip irrigation). Crop choice is particularly
useful because it has an important effect on groundwater use and
is relatively easy to understand and monitor, an example of the
type of simple rules with low transaction costs that van
Steenbergen (2006) identifies as important in providing the basis
for community action. Ultimately, however, the success of such
measures depends on farmers’ decisions. Bekkar et al. (2009),
Kuper et al. (2009), and Faysse et al. (2014) found that
interventions to help farmers understand the nature of
groundwater resources and how their actions could affect the
resource conditions could provide the basis for community
responses. These interventions are examples of the kinds of social
learning that that bring stakeholders together to develop the
capacity and trust needed for collaboration, which Pahl-Wostl et
al. (2007, 2008) argue are increasingly important for water
management.  
Several studies have examined the determinants of collective
action and human behavior using different approaches, including
qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis,
common-pool resource experiments, and action research (Baland
and Platteau 1996, Meinzen-Dick et al. 2002, Poteete et al. 2010,
Janssen and Anderies 2011). A growing number of researchers
use framed field experiments (also referred to as experimental
games) with farmers in rural communities to collect information
on how people, facing real-life resource challenges such as scarce
water supplies, behave and work together to solve collective
problems. Such methods are increasingly used to measure
collective action and test theories about behavior regarding
common-pool resources, including irrigation (Cardenas 2000,
Anderies et al. 2011, Janssen and Anderies 2011, Janssen et al.
2012, Cardenas et al. 2013).  
Here, we examine the main factors that affect the behavior and
attitudes of groundwater users regarding the governance and
management of this common-pool resource in Andhra Pradesh,
India. We used a framed field experiment to look at how people
make decisions related to what crops to plant and how much
groundwater to use. Most of the earlier studies on groundwater
experiments were performed with student participants (but see
Salcedo Du Bois 2014). Our study is performed with farmers who
experience groundwater problems in hard rock aquifers in Andhra
Pradesh, India. We aim to understand the social and biophysical
contextual variables that can explain the decisions of the
participants on simulated crop choice, to understand the factors
that affect groundwater use in practice. A better understanding
of the factors that influence people’s behavior about groundwater
use can be very valuable for the design of future programs aiming
at improving groundwater governance in India.  
We next provide background information on the field study
context in Andhra Pradesh. This is followed by a brief  review of
the literature on framed field experiments on common-pool
resource management in irrigation. We then describe the design
of the overall study and the experimental game. Finally, we
present and analyze the results at the individual and group level,
and conclude with implications of these findings for groundwater
governance.
GROUNDWATER SITUATION IN ANDHRA PRADESH
The state of Andhra Pradesh in India is highly dependent on
groundwater, which is used to irrigate an area of 3.17 million ha,
more than half  of the total area under irrigation (6.28 million
ha), and to meet approximately 80% of the drinking water needs
of the growing population (Directorate of Groundwater, http://
www.aponline.gov.in/apportal/departments/departments.aspx?
dep=20&org=148&category=about#file4). Most of this groundwater
is from hard rock aquifers, which have patchy areas of
groundwater and low storage (World Bank 2010). Since the
mid-1980s, groundwater use has increased dramatically, leading
to falling groundwater tables. Since the 1980s, the number of wells
has increased from 800,000 to 2.5 million, and the land under
groundwater irrigation has almost tripled (Directorate of
Groundwater, http://www.aponline.gov.in/apportal/departments/
departments.aspx?dep=20&org=148&category=about#file4). The
state is divided into 1227 groundwater blocks, of which 300 were
at critical or overexploited levels in 2008, and 208 were at
semicritical levels (World Bank 2010). Kumar et al. (2011) depict
a more pessimistic situation and argue that groundwater
overexploitation has been underestimated because of an
underestimation of the outflows of the systems. They argue that
groundwater irrigation exceeded sustainable withdrawals in 2000–
2001.  
Reversing this situation is not an easy task. Even though
groundwater is a common-pool resource, in most of Andhra
Pradesh, groundwater is not managed under a common property
regime, which poses serious risks for the future of the resource.
Owing to the invisible character of the resource and the difficulties
to monitor private pumping, enforcing specific legislation to
regulate groundwater use is difficult and expensive (Kemper
2007). Individuals construct and operate wells, and although there
Ecology and Society 21(3): 38
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol21/iss3/art38/
are regulations on the development of wells within a certain
distance of an existing well, unless the well owner applies for an
electricity connection, there is little that the state does to enforce
well development, much less their operation. Lack of information
about the underlying resource dynamics, especially in hard rock
aquifers, makes it difficult for communities to act. Moreover,
groundwater can take a long time to renew, further masking the
relationship between use, recharge, and water availability. Private
financing for wells means that wealthier farmers have an
advantage in obtaining groundwater because they are better able
to afford pumps and well deepening.  
Several programs and initiatives have been developed in India and
Andhra Pradesh to address the problem of groundwater
overexploitation. In 2002, the government of India developed the
National Groundwater Recharge Master Plan to encourage the
recuperation of groundwater levels through artificial
groundwater recharge. The plan estimates that a total of 36 billion
m³ can be recharged by using specific recharge structures and
rooftop rainwater harvesting in urban areas (World Bank 2010).
However, the World Bank (2010) argues that the Master Plan may
fail to reach the areas where groundwater overexploitation is more
severe because of the criteria used to identify the most suitable
recharge areas, which include availability of surplus water and
availability of storage space in aquifers. Two major strategies for
addressing groundwater depletion are: (1) increasing recharge
through watershed management, and (2) reducing extractions
through community-based groundwater management, which may
include restrictions on new wells, sharing water from existing
wells, groundwater budgeting, and limitations on water-intensive
crops (for a review of three major approaches used in Andhra
Pradesh, see Reddy et al. 2014; see also Garduño et al. 2009). Crop
choice, in particular, is a visible indicator of groundwater use, but
the links between crops and groundwater use is not always
understood in communities.  
The Foundation for Ecological Security (FES) and Jana Jagriti
(JJ; meaning “awakening people”) are two NGOs that have been
working with communities in Andhra Pradesh to strengthen
governance of common-pool resources, including water
management. JJ has been working in 26 habitations, across three
mandals (administrative divisions) of Chittoor and Anantapur,
for over two decades, on issues related to rural livelihoods and
natural resource governance. Its work includes activities such as
promoting sustainable agriculture, developing watersheds,
crafting institutional arrangements to strengthen land and water
governance, and generating public awareness. The organization
has a team of dedicated field-level functionaries who are
constantly interacting with the communities in villages where they
work to identify and address the issues that people are facing with
respect to their livelihoods. Most of the funding for this work
comes from various government sources such as the National
Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD; the
apex rural refinance institution in India), watershed development
programs, and other government watershed development
initiatives. FES works in > 8000 villages in eight states in India to
promote the conservation and sustainable management of natural
resources, forests, and water in particular, through local self-
governance institutions. FES has diversified funding from Indian
and international funding sources; funding for the work in
Ananthapur has come from NABARD, Hindustan Unilever
Foundation, and Tata Trusts. Both NGOs have provided the tools
and expertise for villagers to measure their groundwater levels and
worked with the villagers to see the relations between water
budgets, crop choice, and groundwater levels.  
FES and JJ work on watershed management in Ananthapur and
Chittoor districts, which are classified as arid to semiarid, with
an average of 500 to 700 mm/yr of rainfall. Ananthapur is one of
the most water-hungry districts in the country, with > 100,000
minor irrigation units (Fourth Minor Irrigation Census; http://
micensus.gov.in/). In Ananthapur, the proportion of area
irrigated by tube wells rose from 44% in 1998–2001 to 76% in
2010–2012; during the same period, the proportion of area
irrigated by dug and open wells declined from 27% to just 4%,
and that by tanks declined from 22% to approximately 15% (based
on three-year averages derived from figures from the Department
of Irrigation and Canal Area Development of the Government
of Andhra Pradesh for 1998–1999 to 2011–2012).  
Given the absence of perennial rivers, Ananthapur has always
relied on the indigenous rainwater harvesting and management
systems such as feeder channels, cascading chains of tanks, and
networking water bodies (Rukmini and Manjula 2009). These
water bodies were an integral part of the economic and cultural
fabric of the rural communities of Ananthapur. A survey
conducted in 2004 by the District Collector of Ananthapur
identified > 5800 water bodies, of which 1373 were large tanks
with a command area of > 0.4 km², and 2094 were small tanks.
The survey found that one-quarter of the identified water bodies
were dysfunctional; the meteoric rise in the number of tube wells
eroded incentives to manage community-based irrigation systems
that had been the bulwark of agriculture and, indeed, much of
rural economy in Ananthapur. Given that many households in
the district cannot afford tube wells, along with the simultaneous
enfeebling of traditional irrigation sources such as tanks, a large
number of farmers cannot practice agriculture with reasonable
assurance. These farmers are finding themselves in a position
where they are forced to cut down on cultivation or find
themselves in unmanageable debt traps.  
Ananthapur predominantly has crystalline rock formations,
which means that there are large fluctuations in groundwater
levels. Although water levels are healthy during the rainy season
and after a good monsoon, they rapidly drop with the advance
of the dry season. In years when rainfall is subpar, which is often,
considering that Ananthapur is one of the most drought-prone
districts in India, the decline in groundwater levels is precarious.
This situation needs to be examined in light of the changing
agricultural patterns in the district. Today, water-intensive crops
such as tomatoes, sunflower, mulberry, and paddy dominate the
agricultural landscape of the district, gradually elbowing out
crops such as millets and pulses. This trend, together with that of
oft-recurring droughts, has led to depletion of the aquifers.
Analysis of time-series data indicates that 55% of wells in
Ananthapur show falling water levels, ranging between 0.15 and
0.65 m/yr. Premonsoon trends indicate that 87% of wells in
Ananthapur witnessed a fall in water levels over the 2000–2012
period (Central Ground Water Board 2012). Of the 65 mandals 
in the district, > 40 are in the critical, semicritical, and
overexploited categories (Central Ground Water Board 2012).  
Our study was conducted in the NP Kunta and Tanakal mandals 
of  Ananthapur. Although both of these mandals fall in the safe
category, groundwater depletion is a clear and present danger.
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Many of the gram panchayats (lowest level government units,
containing several habitations) in these mandals experience acute
water shortage during summers, which becomes exacerbated
during droughts. This brings significant losses to farmers, but
even nonfarmers are affected by falling water tables depleting
domestic water supplies. Women are particularly affected because
they are generally responsible for household domestic water
supplies, which also depend on groundwater. In many villages
where the experimental games were organized, the groundwater
has high fluoride content, posing significant health hazards. The
paucity of potable water is forcing many people to buy water cans
on a regular basis, which adds to the financial burden of rural
households. Finally, in some cases, the shortage of water for
drinking and irrigation is forcing households to migrate. These
facts point to the urgency of effecting sound groundwater
governance mechanisms to strengthen the backbone of the rural
economy of Ananthapur.
EXPERIMENTAL GAMES TO STUDY IRRIGATION
Framed field experiments are frequently used to obtain a better
understanding about how decisions on the use of natural
resources are being made and which factors affect cooperation
decisions (Cardenas and Carpenter 2008, Vollan 2008, Anderies
et al. 2011, Prediger et al. 2011). Such experimental games allow
researchers to isolate particular aspects of the institutional
arrangements (such as the ability to communicate), as well as
study the effect of user characteristics on decision-making. They
are designed to test hypotheses of specific research questions, such
as the effect of cheap talk or costly sanctioning (Ostrom et al.
1994, Fehr and Gächter 2000), or the sensitivity of findings for
different cultures (Cardenas 2000, Cardenas et al. 2000,
Herrmann et al. 2008, Henrich et al. 2010). Basic insights on
factors affecting cooperation are robust for different types of
cultures, although contextual factors affect the level of
cooperation in the various social dilemma experiments.  
Framed field experiments on common-pool resources typically
assume the same decision problem in each round, where changes
in the outcomes over the rounds is caused by changes in the
decisions of the participants (Ostrom et al. 1994). In a typical
experiment, the payoff structure is explained in detail, and
participants are tested on their understanding of the instructions
before the actual game is started. All decisions are made in private,
and the participants receive individual monetary payments based
on the decisions they made; the payments are provided in private
after the experiment.  
Such games only allow us to observe decisions made during the
experiments, and therefore, one may question the external validity
of the findings of the experiments. However, framed field
experiments with actual resource users indicate that decisions
made in the experiments explain independent observations of
actual resource use (Rustagi et al. 2010, Anderies et al. 2011).  
One of the recent developments in framed field experimental
studies for common-pool resources is the more explicit inclusion
of ecological dynamics (Janssen et al. 2010, 2012, Cardenas et al.
2013). By including dynamics such as the depletion of the
resource, experiments show that participants are more sensitive
to myopic behavior of overharvesting, prioritizing short-run over
long-run gains (Herr et al. 1997, Moxnes 1998a,b). In the
experiment we performed, participants could deplete the
groundwater resource over time, where time was represented as
the rounds of the experiment.  
There is a modest literature of experimental studies on common-
pool resources that explicitly focus on groundwater. Gardner et
al. (1997) show that a quota system leads to the best outcomes
for groups sharing groundwater compared to restricting entry to
a smaller number of participants. Suter et al. (2012) show that a
spatial representation of a groundwater game leads to less myopic
behavior compared to a nonspatial representation. Salcedo Du
Bois (2014) compared groundwater experiments with student
participants and Mexican farmers and found less myopic behavior
with the student participants. The experimental design we used is
within the tradition of Cardenas et al. (2013), in which a resource
is replenished a small amount each round independently of how
heavily the resource is used, and participants can overharvest the
resource if  they extract more resource units than are replenished.  
Groundwater resources show some particular challenges that
hinder the development of collaborative outcomes. Individual
farmers can easily gain access to groundwater resources if  they
own or lease land and can invest in a well. However, developing
self-governance norms for groundwater systems is usually more
challenging because irrigators may have limited information
about the boundaries, structure, and capacity of the common-
pool resource (Schlager 2007). Because the participants are
farmers with small land holdings and few alternatives for income
generation, choosing whether or not to use irrigation can mean
the difference between subsistence-level living and slightly better
living standards. Owing to the invisible character of groundwater
resources, appropriation and provision problems are initially less
obvious to groundwater users. The game we designed makes
explicit the effect of individuals’ crop choice on overall
groundwater levels and then examines the factors that affect
farmers’ choice of water-consumptive (but profitable) or less
water-consumptive (but less profitable) crops. The subsequent
debriefing sessions within the community link the game to actual
experiences of groundwater use and depletion and provide an
entry for NGOs to discuss what the community might do to
manage their groundwater more sustainably. However, our focus
here is on the factors affecting crop choice.
METHODS
Game structure
We used a field experiment framed as a groundwater governance
exercise to simulate the effects of crop choice on groundwater
levels (see Appendix 1 for the detailed experiment protocol). In
each habitation (a named, distinct cluster of houses that
constitutes the local community), two groups of participants were
recruited: five men and five women. During the session, other
community members were excluded from the room where the
experiment was conducted to minimize distractions or outsiders’
influence on the participants. Each group played two sequential
games of 10 rounds each (although the players were not told how
many rounds there would be). In the first game, no
communication between the participants was allowed. After the
first game was completed, the group was instructed to discuss the
game with each other for 3 min. A field team member acted as
secretary, recording the topics discussed during the
communication periods. Following the discussion, a second game
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was played, this time with short communication periods of up to
1 min following each round.  
At the beginning of each experiment, the group shared a single
shared groundwater resource of 50 units. During each round, the
participants were asked to choose one of two crops for planting:
Crop A, which used one unit of groundwater and provided two
units of income; or Crop B, which used three units of groundwater
and provided five units of income. Players were instructed that
each round simulated the rabi, or dry season, which depends
primarily on groundwater. The participants recorded their crop
choice in private on a handheld paper form. Their decisions were
recorded by a field team member, and the resulting payoff for
each participant was written onto their decision form. The total
number of water units consumed by the group was recorded
publicly on the presentation board to show how many units of
groundwater remained (Fig. 1). Designed to be used for the
instruction process at the beginning of the experiment session and
for conducting the game itself, the presentation board was printed
with an illustration of different types of crops, a bore well, a
column to show the water table, an illustration of the water
consumption and payoffs for each crop, and a demonstration
chart of the water table at the end of each round if  all players
were to choose Crop A or Crop B. At the beginning of each round
following round 1, aquifer recharge was simulated by adding 5
units of water to the total groundwater resource. The group played
the game for 10 rounds or until, at the end of a round, the
groundwater resource had < 10 units of water remaining. This
condition ensured that at least 15 units of water would be available
after replenishment and all participants could choose Crop B
without reaching negative amounts of groundwater.
Fig. 1. Visual aid used in explaining the groundwater game.
The water demand-payoff structure of the game was set up so
that if  all participants chose to plant Crop A every round, the
game could continue indefinitely. If  all chose Crop B, the
groundwater resource would be depleted and the game ended after
four rounds, which is the Nash equilibrium in which each actor
is assumed to be rational, to act in their own self-interest, and to
assume the others do likewise. The group earnings under the Nash
equilibrium would be 100 units of income. There are many game
variations consisting of choice combinations of Crop B (22 times)
and Crop A (28 times) that lead to the social optimum, where the
group earns 166 units of income. If  properly coordinated, the
groundwater resource can last for the full 10 rounds, only
becoming exhausted at the end of the 10th round. The
participants were not told that there would be 10 rounds in the
game, although after playing the first game, it would have been
generally clear for the second game.  
Following the sessions with both men’s and women’s groups, the
field team conducted a community-wide debriefing meeting to
discuss the groundwater exercise and aggregate the results from
the games. The debriefing was a form of participatory exercise to
encourage discussion of the issues around groundwater depletion
and what farmers could do about it. In this, the debriefing was
similar to the participatory workshops to discuss groundwater
issues in France, Portugal, and Morocco, as described by Faysse
et al. (2014), but without including government agencies, and
using the games as a starting point for discussion. Our community
debriefing was usually held in the afternoon or evening after the
games, but in some cases, it had to be held on a following day. The
debriefing was a guided conversation for game participants to
relate their experiences from the game to the groundwater
situation in their area and to discuss with other community
members possible courses of action. As in the experiment sessions,
a field team member acted as secretary, writing notes on the
discussion and comments raised during the meeting. We also
collected a brief  survey from each participant after they had
participated in the game. The survey covered background
information about the individual, their household, as well as their
attitudes toward environmental issues, to be used to assess factors
that might explain their choices in the game.
Payment method
Most field experiments pay individuals based on their “earnings”
during the game. In line with the principles of experimental
economics, a real, substantial incentive is provided for the
decisions to be made. The earnings vary depending on how
participants play the game, recreating the kind of commons
dilemma faced in practice: individuals will get more monetary
earnings if  they choose the more water-intensive crop, but if  the
whole group does that, the water is depleted faster and they will
earn less than if  they chose the more sustainable crop. So some
individuals will be paid more than others, and this is expected to
affect how they play (Smith and Walker 1993).  
In this project, the participating NGOs are interested in using the
groundwater games in their community organizing activities after
the project is completed. Preliminary outcomes have been
positive. However, individual payments are less feasible in their
project management approach. It is becoming standard practice
for NGOs to make a contribution to a community fund when the
community members participate in studies, and it is important to
determine what effect, if  any, using a different payment scheme
would have on the games and their utility for the NGOs. We
therefore organized the experiments with two treatments
controlling for payment method to test whether, in this field
environment, the payment scheme affected behavior in the games.  
Participants in the individual-payments treatment received Rs 5
for each unit of income earned in both games. Their earnings
varied depending on how they played the game, and total earnings
could range between Rs 200 and 500 per participant in the
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individual-payments treatment. For comparative purposes, the
daily wage for National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 
(NREGA) projects is Rs 115. All households are entitled to up
to 100 days of employment at NREGA sites, but this is often hard
physical labor. In the flat-fee treatment, individual participants
were not paid, but the local watershed committee was given a
donation of Rs 2000. Only one approach, either individual or flat-
fee payments, was used in each community to prevent cross-
contamination. People who participated but did not receive
individual payments did not see the others being paid individual
earnings. We also included control communities, i.e., habitations
that were covered by the same watershed management programs
from the government and the NGOs but did not participate in
the games. This was to allow us to subsequently test whether the
games had an effect on collective action. Because the control
communities did not play the games, they are not included here.
Sampling
To allocate habitations to the treatment and control groups, we
drew a stratified systematic sample with a random start. The
process involved listing all the habitations according to watershed
(four where FES is working, and three where JJ operates), and
then within each watershed, by the number of houses. We verified
that each habitation uses groundwater for irrigation from bore
wells or open wells. We then randomly drew a number between
one and three for the start. That habitation on the list received
treatment A (individual payments), then we proceeded down the
list with treatment B (flat fee to watershed committee), C (control),
and cycling back to A to continue the assignments.  
This sampling method was used because with relatively small
sample sizes, it is an efficient way to ensure that the sample is
distributed across key variables that are likely to affect outcomes.
In this case, we stratified on watershed and size of community.
Watersheds might affect behavior because of different rainfall
patterns or other factors such as different effectiveness of the
watershed development programs, NGOs, or field staff  assigned
to the watershed. Number of houses is a good proxy for number
of households or decision makers; the size of the community is
often hypothesized to affect collective action (Olson 1965, Ostrom
1990, Agrawal 2001).  
The resulting sample had nine habitations in treatment A and
eight habitations in treatment B (see Table 2.1 in Appendix 1). To
select the participants within each site, the study team contacted
the watershed community to ask them to identify five men and
five women from households that use groundwater for irrigation
to participate in an activity that looks at how people make
decisions on what crops to plant. Although men are reported (by
men and women) to be the primary decision makers on what crops
to grow and how to irrigate, we wanted to see if  women would
have different preferences or ways of dealing with trade-offs
between short-term income and long-term water tables.
Participants were told that the activity would take approximately
2.5 h, they would need to come together in a group for that whole
time, and they would have to answer a short survey on a later day.
All participants did not need to own wells; if  they used water from
a neighbor, that was also acceptable. The men and women could
not be from the same household, and the committee was asked
to select participants that came from different farm-holding sizes.
The committee was also told whether individuals would be paid
based on the outcome of the activity or there would be a joint
payment to the watershed committee (but was not told that other
payment options were being used in other habitations), and that
a debriefing would be held for the whole community after the
activity.
Models
The data used in the analysis of water use in the groundwater
game are derived from 34 experiment sessions performed in
Andhra Pradesh, India between February and May 2013. The
data set consists of 170 people in 34 groups from 17 villages. Each
group played two games, once without and once with
communication. Two groups were recruited in each village: a
men’s group and a women’s group. Each group consisted of five
participants, and each participant recorded their crop choice for
10 rounds or until the water table dropped below 10 units,
whichever came first, resulting in a total of 3400 observations.  
In both Models 1 and 2, the dependent variable is crop choice
(and consequently water use). We analyzed both individual- and
group-aggregate decisions to verify the robustness of our results.
The individual-level analysis used logistic regression (logit) to
estimate the probability of choosing the more water-consumptive
crop (B). The group-level analysis used ordinary least squares
regression (OLS) of total water use, with robust standard errors.  
The first set of independent variables in both models relates to
the game structure: the groundwater level at the start of each
round, the payment type (individual or flat fee), and whether
communication was allowed. The groundwater level was included
because when water is more abundant, we would expect less effort
to save water (see Bardhan 1993). Payment type was included to
test whether individual payment based on winnings in the game
(the standard in experimental games) actually affects behavior
(Gneezy et al. 2011). Communication was included because it is
hypothesized to increase cooperation (Cardenas and Carpenter
2008). The next variable is the number of years that the NGO has
been working in the habitation, to test whether exposure to an
NGO promoting groundwater management increases cooperative
outcomes, consistent with Baland and Platteau’s (1996)
observation that a history of successful cooperation increases
future cooperation. We also included basic demographic
variables, including gender, age, education, caste, household size,
and an interaction effect for gender and education (because
women have lower education, overall, than do men). We
hypothesized that women would be more water-saving because
they are more severely affected by groundwater depletion, and
that education would make people more aware of the interactions
between irrigation and water levels and, hence, more water-
conserving. Including caste tests whether higher-status people are
more or less cooperative (Lecoutere et al. 2015).  
Because social capital is hypothesized to increase collective action
(Agrawal 2001), we developed a social capital indicator from the
following series of questions on the individual survey:  
1. If  a neighbor in this village lends some money to another
neighbor, it is very likely that the lender gets the money back
(values 1 to 5). 
2. Suppose that 10 of your neighbors are invited to help in
community activities. How many would show up? (values 0
to 10). 
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Table 1. Definition and summary of the independent variables used in the analysis. Values in square brackets give ranges of continuous
variables; values in curvy brackets are possible values of categorical variables.
 
Variable Definition Value range Mean
Available water Quantity of groundwater available at beginning of
round, after recharge
[0, 50] 33.287 units
Flat fee Flat-fee treatment used {0, 1} 0.471 games
Communication Communication allowed {0, 1} 1.412 games
Round Round number in game [1, 10]
Years in program Number of years village has participated in
nongovernmental organization program
[6, 20] 11.6 yr
Female Female participant {0, 1} 0.5
Age Participant’s age [20, 86] 38.5 yr
Caste Participants’ caste category {4 = scheduled tribe, 3 = scheduled
caste, 2 = other backward castes, 1 =
other castes}
1.78
Education Highest education level achieved {0 = none, 1 = adult literacy class, 2 =
primary school, 3 = secondary school,
4 = intermediate school, 5 = technical
school, 6 = university}
2.02
Female × Education Interaction effect for women and education level [0, 6] 0.82
Household size Total number of people living in household (adults and
children)
[1, N] 4.8 people
Social capital Social capital metric based on related questions from the
individual survey
[0, 1] 0.969
Area owned Total area of land owned (ha) [0, N] 2.105
Area tank-irrigated Area of land irrigated by tank water (ha) [0, N] 0.131
Area groundwater-irrigated Area of land irrigated by groundwater (ha) [0, N] 0.630
3. If  a mother in this village has an emergency and needs to
leave her baby for the day, she will easily find someone in
this village she can trust with her baby (values 1 to 5). 
4. Most of the people in my habitation are trustworthy and are
honest (values 1 to 5). 
The social capital metric is calculated by adding the scores of the
four questions and dividing by the maximum score (25) to
normalize it to a value between 0 and 1. We made a selection of
the questions from the survey and chose the questions above since
they represent concrete questions related to trust and social
capital. We expect that those with higher social capital (trust in
others) would be less likely to overexploit groundwater.  
In Model 2, we added total land owned and irrigated by tanks
and wells to account for dependence on agriculture and irrigation,
as well as knowledge of the resource (in the case of the area of
groundwater irrigated).
RESULTS
The independent variables chosen to describe the characteristics
theorized to affect cooperation in the games were summarized
(Table 1). The average age of participants was 38.5 yr, with the
men significantly older than the women: 42.9 yr vs. 34.0 yr,
respectively (Appendix 1). Education level varied among
participants: 30% had not received any formal education, 26%
had completed primary education, 34% had completed secondary
school, and the remaining 10% had completed higher levels of
education such as intermediate school or university. Significant
differences were also observed if  we disaggregated the education
data by gender. Only 15% of the men had not received any formal
education in comparison with 45% of the women, and 35% of
the men had completed primary school in comparison with 17%
of the women. In higher levels of education, the differences
between men and women were smaller, although the proportion
of men that had received higher levels of education was higher:
38% of the men had completed secondary school vs. 31% of the
women. This is consistent with the literacy rates of 74% for men
and 54% for women in Ananthapur District (http://www.ap.gov.
in/districts/).  
On average, each game was played for 9.12 rounds, with the
shortest game lasting 4 rounds and the longest lasting 10 rounds
(Appendix 1). Approximately 65% of the games were played for
the maximum number of rounds (i.e., 10 rounds). On average, the
games with communication were played for more rounds (9.44)
than the games without communication (8.79; P < 0.001,
Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed Ranks test). The level of water
remaining at the end of the 10 rounds was not different before or
after communication was allowed (P = 0.12, Wilcoxon Matched-
Pairs Signed Ranks test), whereas the group income at the end of
the game was higher in the game with communication (P = 0.045,
Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed Ranks test). A closer look at the
behavior of the players over the 10 rounds of the game shows that
communication was particularly effective at the beginning and at
the end of the game when, on average, players maximized their
earnings (Fig. 2). Surprisingly, communication did not favor water
conservation, although group earnings were higher when
communication was allowed. Water use was greater in the rounds
with communication (Fig. 3), although the differences were not
significant.
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Fig. 2. Average earnings for the 34 participant groups in games
without participant communication and with communication
after each round.
Fig. 3. Average amount of water remaining after extraction for
the 34 participant groups in games without participant
communication and with communication after each round.
The groups earned between 97 and 160 units of income per game.
Recall that the Nash equilibrium was 100 units and the social
optimum was 166 units. The median group earnings were 136.5
units in treatment A (individual payments) and 140.5 units in
treatment B (flat fee). This shows that, overall, the decisions were
closer to the social optimum than the Nash equilibrium. The
implication is that the groups were able to cooperate, even without
communication.  
In the communities where FES ran the experiments, participants
earned an average of 136.4 units of income per game compared
to 136.5 units in the communities where JJ ran the experiments.
This is not significantly different (P > 0.1, Mann-Whitney test).
In both cases, communication led to a significant improvement
in community earnings (P < 0.01, Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs
Signed Ranks test), with 140.4 units with communication and
137.4 units without it. This suggests that communication had a
bigger influence in communities where FES was participating (P 
= 0.095, Mann-Whitney test). Contrary to expectations, we did
not find any significant effects for gender or payment scheme.  
Water use was highest when groundwater levels were near the
maximum (Fig. 4). As groundwater levels were depleted,
participants switched to the less water-intensive Crop A. This
slowed the decline of the group groundwater levels but did not
stabilize them.
Fig. 4. Average number of Crop B (intensive water use) per
group for different levels of ground water available, in games
without participant communication and with communication
after each round.
In the individual-payments treatment, the average payment per
participant was Rs 273 (range: Rs 175–395). There were no
significant differences between the behaviors of the participants
in both treatments. The earnings of the flat-fee treatment (Rs 280;
range: Rs 190–395) were essentially the same as those of the
individual-payments treatment, suggesting that the game had
equal salience to decision-making, whether or not players were
paid cash based on the outcomes of their decisions.  
In the individual- and group-level models, the individual and
group-average water use were considered as the dependent
variable (Table 2). Participants who reported stronger agreement
with trust and social capital indicators in their communities used
less water. This is consistent with theory because if  a farmer
refrains from using a water-consumptive but profitable crop to
make the water table last longer, but his or her neighbors use the
more water-consumptive crop, that farmer pays the price but does
not get the benefit of stable water tables. However, those farmers
who trust that their neighbors will help each other are more likely
to believe that others will also cut back on water consumption
and that a mutually beneficial situation can be achieved.  
A notably strong effect on water usage was the length of time the
villages were involved with NGOs. Both NGOs are working in
adjoining watersheds with similar agroecological conditions and
have similar practices in working with the communities in
groundwater management, but JJ has been working with these
communities on watershed management for 19 to 20 yr, whereas
FES has been working with their communities for only 6 yr. JJ’s
relationships with their communities may be more deeply
established, thus leading the members of these communities to a
stronger understanding of groundwater problems and water
governance. It is also possible that this result indicates an
experimenter effect. The field teams received separate training,
and because of the need for additional test sites in our project,
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Table 2. Individual- and group-level models for choice of water-consumptive crops.
 
Individual-level models (logit) Group-level models (OLS)
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Available water 0.030** 0.031** 0.089** 0.095**
Flat-fee treatment −0.060 −0.133 −0.139 −0.119
Communication 0.058 0.049 0.134 0.139
Round −0.139** −0.137** −0.208** −0.188**
Years in program −0.056** −0.057** −0.128** −0.128**
Female −0.032 −0.022 −0.206 −0.636
Age −0.004 −0.034 −0.048** −0.067**
Caste 0.077 0.070 −0.144 0.121
Education −0.129** −0.133** −0.198 −0.309
Female × Education 0.092† 0.088 0.040 0.241
Household size 0.005 0.004 0.096 0.243†
Social capital −0.916* −0.691 −5.204** −5.861**
Area owned −0.082* −0.032
Area tank-irrigated 0.294† 0.038
Area groundwater-irrigated 0.208** 0.246*
Constant 0.484 0.413 14.260** 13.312**
N 3054 2910 620 620
Akaike Information Criterion 3575.789 3404.210 2936.475 2933.551
Log-likelihood/R² −1774.895 −1686.105 0.295 0.305
*P < 0.05, **P < 0.01; †P < 0.1. Significance level derived from robust standard errors.
the JJ team was recruited and trained at a later date, potentially
receiving less background on field experiment principles and
protocols compared to the FES field team. However, the long
history of JJ work in the communities seems to be a stronger
explanation for these results.  
The water-use control variable, i.e., water availability at the
beginning of each round, was highly significant, as expected: the
higher the water table at the beginning of the round, the more
water was used in that round (Fig. 4). This is a rational response
because as long as water is abundant, participants might as well
profit from it, but when participants see water tables start to fall,
they consider reducing water use to ensure that the resource lasts.  
Contrary to expectations, gender did not have a significant effect
on crop choice. However, higher education led to lower water use
in the game, and women have a significantly lower education level
than men (P < 0.001, t-test; Appendix 1). An interaction effect
between education and gender was only marginally significant in
Model 1. Although gender is not significant after controlling for
education, the fact that women, on average, chose more water-
consumptive crops is somewhat surprising. Women are primarily
responsible for domestic water use and are therefore most affected
when the water table falls and domestic water wells in the villages
go dry. Follow-up qualitative research indicated that women
associate the failure of domestic water wells with low rainfall and
not with groundwater use for irrigation. A second factor may also
be at work: women’s time constraints. Although the teams tried
to schedule the women’s games at a convenient time, it was difficult
for women to set aside the time for the full game session. Thus,
some of the women’s groups were willing to deplete the
groundwater more rapidly to end the game and return to family
responsibilities. This indicates the need to be aware of other
factors that may affect the way people make choices in
experimental games.  
Farmers with larger land holdings were significantly less likely to
choose water-consumptive crops. This may mean that those with
large total land holdings can cultivate larger areas under water-
saving crops rather than depending on more profitable but more
water-intensive crops. Landowners with more lands might be
more familiar with the connection of groundwater levels and crop
choice. However, those who have more land under tank or
groundwater irrigation are more likely to choose the water-
consumptive crops in the game, which may reflect their own
farming practices and familiarity with higher value crops.  
With all other variables held constant, communication did not
have a significant effect on water use, compared to the first 10
rounds without communication. A possible reason for the lack of
effect on collective crop choice is the familiarity of the participants
with each other and the context of the game. Chat between the
participants may not affect expectations of the actions of others
nor contribute to a better understanding of the experiment.  
Other measured demographic features had very little effect on
crop choice. Age was only significant at the group level, and
neither caste nor household size had a significant effect at the
individual level.  
We observed no effect of payment method used in each
community. This is a surprising result from the perspective of
experimental economics theory, which predicts the payment and
its salience to the subjects is a significant factor in motivating
realistic behavior (Hoffman et al. 1996). Respondents did not play
the game differently if  they were playing for real money or simply
for imaginary payments. This calls into question the premise of
many field experiments that payments based on outcomes of the
game are necessary to simulate commons dilemmas (Smith and
Walker 1993). It is possible that the participants might not have
perceived the payments as significant or have been affected by
them as strongly as other motivations or priorities during the
game session. More research is needed to understand better how
participants perceive the game experience and how they prioritize
individual monetary incentives vs. other goals they may hold.
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CONCLUSION
We performed experimental games on crop choice and
groundwater use in 17 habitations of Andhra Pradesh, India. The
groundwater situation in Andhra Pradesh is delicate because
groundwater is the main source of water for many households,
and many aquifers in the state are overexploited and wells are
running dry. A common-pool resource game was used to observe
how people make decisions about groundwater use and to
understand which factors influence people’s decisions related to
groundwater management.  
The first important finding is that participants do consider group
interests, not only their individual interests, in the game. Almost
65% of the games were played for the maximum number of
rounds, which suggests that group gains and groundwater
conservation were pursued by most participants when the links
were explained to them in the game. This is consistent with what
is found in other field experiments regarding the use of common-
pool resources (e.g., Cardenas and Carpenter 2008, Janssen et al.
2012, Cardenas et al. 2013).  
If  such levels of cooperation are found in the game, why is it that
groundwater levels are being depleted in practice? One factor may
be that the game makes explicit the links between crop choice,
collective action, and groundwater levels. Many farmers reported
in the debriefing sessions that they had thought that groundwater
levels were mostly affected by rainfall, and they had not
understood the effect of their crop choice on water table levels.
In this sense, the experimental games provided the basis for social
leaning about groundwater and the scope for collective responses
to arrest falling water tables. This is not to say that the games
themselves, or the debriefing sessions, are sufficient to change the
trajectory of groundwater levels. However, they can provide an
important complement to other interventions for community-
based groundwater management.  
The individual water-use level is partly explained by social capital:
consistent with theory (e.g., Agrawal 2001), those participants
reporting the highest social capital in their community used less
water. Those who trust their neighbors are more likely to make
cooperative choices, which can improve the sustainability of the
resource. This finding can have important policy implications,
indicating the value of programs that promote collective action
and community cooperation for the governance of groundwater
resources. There was a considerable difference in crop choices
between the communities facilitated by the two NGOs, with
participants choosing less water consumption where the NGO
had been working for a longer time. This increases our confidence
that choices in the game reflect, in some way, choices in practice
because the communities where the NGO has worked longest
would be more likely to understand the importance of crop choice
and overcome groundwater dilemmas.  
Two variables that did not have a significant effect are particularly
important: gender and payment scheme. The fact that women
were not more likely to limit water-consumptive crops to maintain
the groundwater levels was surprising, given that women are most
responsible for domestic water, which becomes scarcer when water
tables fall. The structure of the game did not include explicit
linkages between irrigation and domestic water availability. It is
possible that if  this had been included, women would have shown
more concern about falling water tables. Further exploration of
gender differences in understanding of the game, perceptions of
groundwater dynamics, and roles in crop choice would be needed
to explain these patterns.  
The lack of significant difference between individual payments
and flat-fee compensation to the watershed committee has
methodological relevance for future experimental games design.
Our games appear to be equally salient to the intrinsically
motivated farmers, whether or not they are paid cash based on
the simulated earnings in the game (Gneezy et al. 2011). However,
we find that the decisions are in line with actual behavior of
individuals, such as higher water use by those who have more
groundwater irrigation and higher water use when groundwater
levels are higher. If  payment does not affect how people respond
in such games, it could expand the possibilities of using framed
field experiments in situations where it is inappropriate to pay
participants. However, serious consideration should be given to
what effect these games have on participants. In the case of these
groundwater activities, the games can actually have beneficial
effects in making farmers aware of how their crop choices affect
water tables and in stimulating discussions on what farmers can
do to regulate groundwater use. The games can therefore be a
valuable complement to government or NGO activities.  
Experimental games do not always reflect how people behave in
practice, but they do provide insights on factors that affect their
choices. More research is needed to understand some of the
surprising findings such as the lack of effect of individual
monetary incentives and the lack of a gender effect. However, we
found a remarkable effect associated with how long the
communities had been involved with NGO participatory
management projects. Future research will focus on solicitation
of mental models to derive a better understanding of how
participants see the relationship between crop choice,
groundwater use, and the performance of the community to help
assist government and NGO programs identify the factors that
contribute to community management of groundwater resources.
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Appendix 1.  Protocol for Experimental Game, Survey, and Community Debriefing 
 
Groundwater Field Experiment Protocol  
 
[FACILITATOR: Make sure everyone is sitting and not distracted by other matters. Read aloud, 
from the script, and always alert to any questions; be alert for facial expressions of the 
participants to detect lack of understanding of the activity. 1 
 
Instructions to read to the participants 
 
Hello, I am _____ from FES. As a part of our hydrology project, we want to understand how you 
make your decisions on what crops to plant. This is a voluntary experience for you to help us to 
understand what you do. In case there is something you do not understand during the 
instructions, we invite you to raise your hand and we will be glad to respond to any question. We 
ask you to turn off your mobile phones to avoid any distractions during the activity. You are free 
to leave any time you wish, however if you leave, this session will end for everyone else also.  
 
The types of crops that you choose to plant affect how much groundwater is used and how much 
money you make. We all know that crops like paddy and sugar cane require more water to grow 
than crops like groundnut and ragi, but paddy and sugar cane also can fetch more income than 
groundnut and ragi. Isn’t that so? 
 
So, if everyone grows paddy or sugar cane, then the groundwater levels are likely to fall more 
than if everyone grows groundnut or ragi.  Does that make sense? 
 
[Wait for responses] 
 
We are going to play an activity that looks at how people make these decisions of what crops to 
plant. This is not a test; it is just an opportunity for you to make decisions just like you do all the 
time. But in this situation, you will be playing through several years of planting crops in a short 
period of time. This activity is very simple, and it doesn’t include all the things that you usually 
deal with in your fields. We are just focusing on the rabi season, which depends only on boru 
(groundwater). And we are focusing on how you decide between planting one or two different 
kinds of crops.  They are not actual crops that you use; they are pretend crops. One requires a 
little amount of water to grow and it gives you a small amount of money. We will call that Crop 
A.  The other crop requires more water to grow but gives you more money. We will call that 
Crop B.  
 
[ONLY for the Individual Payments treatment:] You will be paid cash at the end of this session 
based on the crops you choose to plant. 
 
                                                          
1 Text highlighted in gray are instructions for the experimenters. 
 
Figure 1. Crop A/B Comparison 
 
Any Questions? [Wait for any questions] 
 
We will begin by playing an activity. After we have finished playing the activity, we will have a 
discussion period to allow you to talk about the activity and your thoughts. When we have 
completed our discussion, we will play the activity again so you can try out the ideas that you 
may have talked about. During the first activity, you are asked not to speak; we also ask that you 
not tell other people in the village about this activity until the community meeting. During the 
second activity, you will have 45 seconds to talk after each year to discuss your plans.  
 
This activity is intended to recreate the situation in which people must make decisions about 
using water to grow crops. You have been organized into a group of five individuals. You will 
play a number of years, which have one pretend growing season, when all your water comes 
from groundwater. Though each of you may have different amounts of land, for this activity you 
should pretend that you all have the same amount of land, say 1 hectare. 
 
At the beginning of the activity, there are 50 units of groundwater available for your group to 
grow crops. The amount of groundwater available is shown on the board as blue water in a bore 
well. As water is used, we will move the blue column down to show you how much groundwater 
is remaining. Every year, you will have to make a decision, which of the two crops to plant: Crop 
A or Crop B. Crop A costs one unit of water and gives two units of income. Crop B costs three 
units of water and gives five units of income. At the beginning of each year, the groundwater 
supply recharges by 5 units of water. We will show this recharge happen by moving the blue 
column up by 5 units of water in the bore well. 
 
 
Figure 2. Water Level Indicator 
 
So looking at our picture of a bore well, if everyone plants crop A, 5 units of water will be used, 
leaving 45 units of water. At the beginning of the next round, the groundwater will recharge with 
5 units of water, so there will be 50 units of water available for the group. 
 
If everyone plants crop B, 15 units of water will be used, leaving 35 units of water. At the 
beginning of the next round, the groundwater will recharge with 5 units of water, so there will be 
40 units of water available. 
 
If some people choose Crop A and others choose Crop B, then the amount of water that will be 
used will between these two possibilities. 
 
[ONLY for the Individual Payments treatment, state:] At the end of the game, we will pay you Rs 
5 for every unit of money you earn in this game.  So if you earn 20 units of money in the game, 
we will give you 100 rupees.  We will give you your earnings in private, so that no one else 
knows how much you made.   
 
We will play the activity for a number of years. If the groundwater level drops below 10 units of 
water, which is marked here with this red line, for simplicity’s sake, the activity is ended due to 
insufficient water for the group. 
 
When the activity is ended, we will begin a discussion period, where you can talk about the 
activity, and share any thoughts or observations you may have about your experience. After the 
discussion session, we will play the activity again, starting with a fresh groundwater supply of 50 
units. 
 
I will now describe how we will play the activity in detail. We are handing each of you a piece of 
paper, your Decision Form. Each year, you will choose which crop to plant by circling one of the 
two options in the “My Crop” column. Circle “A” if you want to plant crop A, or circle “B” if 
you want to plant crop B. We will come around to record which crop you want to plant, and we 
will write how much income you receive for your crops in your Income column. Hold the 
Decision Form in your hand so only we can see which crop you have chosen to plant. 
 
 
Figure 3. Participant Decision Form (also shown in large-format to participants for 
instruction) 
 
We will calculate how much water the group has used, and we will move the blue column down 
to show you how much groundwater remains. This is the end of the year. 
 
At the beginning of the next year, we will move the blue column up by 5 units of water to show 
you the groundwater recharge and announce how much groundwater is available to your group. 
 
So for example, if everyone were to plant Crop A every round, the groundwater supply will fully 
recharge every round. Each participant would earn a total of 20 units of income from their crops. 
 
 
Figure 4. Comparison of Everyone Playing A vs Everyone Playing B (AAAAA vs BBBBB) 
 
If everyone plants Crop B every round, the groundwater supply would last for 5 rounds. Each 
participant would earn 25 units of income from their crops. 
 
Keep in mind that your decisions are private, and everyone can decide for themselves which crop 
they wish to plant each round. This means when you show us your Decision Form, only we see 
the crops you circled on your form.  
 
Do you have any questions about this? [FACILITATOR: pause to resolve questions.] 
 
Keep in mind that from now on you are not allowed to talk to each other until we tell you it is ok 
for you to do so. 
 
First, we will play three practice years that will not count toward the results of the groundwater 
levels. These practice rounds are just an opportunity for you familiarize yourself with the 
activity.  
 
After we have completed the practice years, you will have another opportunity to ask any 




[FACILITATOR: If this is the second practice round, add 5 units of water to the groundwater 
diagram.] 
 
This is the beginning of a new practice year. [5 units of groundwater have recharged.]2 There are 
___ units of groundwater available. Please make your decision on which crop you will plant for 
this round, Crop A or Crop B. Please carefully show your Decision Form to the monitor when 
they come to you. 
 
[MONITOR: Write down each participant’s crop decision on the Monitor Form. Calculate the 
amount of water used, and the remaining water. Show these numbers to the Facilitator.] 
 
For the practice years only, we are going to tell you how many people chose to plant crop A and 
crop B, so you can tell us how many units of water was used, and how many units of income 
each person received. 
 
____ people chose to plant Crop A, and ____ people chose to plant Crop B.  
 
How many units of water have been used?  
 
How many units of income do the people who planted Crop A receive?  
 
How many units of income do the people who planted Crop B receive? 
 
[FACILITATOR: If this is not the last practice round, return to the beginning of the practice 
round instructions above. Otherwise, continue to the Beginning of the actual activity rounds 
below.] 
 
[That was the last practice year. Do you have any questions?] 
 
[Look for any questions] 
 
[We will now reset the groundwater level to 50 units of water and begin the real exercise.] 
  
                                                          
2 Text underlined inside brackets is conditional. Only recite this text if it applies to the current status of the activity 
(as in there is recharge for years following the first year.) Skip it if it doesn’t apply now. 
ACTIVITY 1:  YEARS WITHOUT COMMUNICATION 
 
[FACILITATOR: If this is round 2 or later, add 5 units of water to the groundwater diagram.] 
 
This is the beginning of a new practice year. [5 units of groundwater have recharged.] There are 
___ units of groundwater available. Please make your decision on which crop you will plant for 
this round, Crop A or Crop B. Please carefully show your Decision Form to the monitor when 
they come to you. 
 
[MONITOR: Walk around to each participant and write down their crop decision on the Monitor 
Recording Form. Calculate how much water has been used by the group’s crops. Announce how 
much water was used by the group.] 
 
[FACILITATOR: subtract the water usage from the water level poster.] 
 
[FACILITATOR: If the remaining amount of groundwater is less than 10 units, announce the end 
of the activity. Otherwise, move to the next round.] 
 
IF CONTINUE TO NEXT YEAR: 
 





[There is no longer sufficient groundwater available for the group.] 
 
This was the last year and the activity is now ended. We are now going to gather your Decision 
Forms and we are going to discuss your experience in the exercise. 
 
[MONITOR: Gather the participants’ Decision Forms. Store the forms in the correct envelope.] 
 
[FACILITATOR: Use the Discussion Guidelines to ask questions and encourage talking between 
the participants.] 
 
[RECORDER: Use the Discussion Topics Instrument to check off the topics that are brought up 
by the participants. Also write down any issues or interesting points that are brought up by the 
group.] 
  
ACTIVITY 2:  YEARS WITH COMMUNICATION 
 
[FACILITATOR: If this is round 2 or later, add 5 units of water to the groundwater diagram.] 
This is the beginning of a new practice year. [5 units of groundwater have recharged.] There are 
___ units of groundwater available.  
 
You have 45 seconds to talk with each other about the next year. 
 
[MONITOR: time the group for 45 seconds. When that time has elapsed, raise your hand so the 
Facilitator can announce that there is no more talking.] 
 
Your discussion time has ended. 
 
Please make your decision on which crop you will plant for this round, Crop A or Crop B. Please 
carefully show your Decision Form to the monitor when they come to you. 
 
[MONITOR: Walk around to each participant and write down their crop decision on the Monitor 
Recording Form. Calculate how much water has been used by the group’s crops. Announce how 
much water was used by the group.] 
 
[FACILITATOR: subtract the water usage from the water level poster.] 
 
[FACILITATOR: If the remaining amount of groundwater is less than 10 units, announce the end 
of the activity. Otherwise, move to the next round.] 
 
IF CONTINUE TO NEXT YEAR: 
This year has now ended. 
 
END ACTIVITY: 
[There is no longer sufficient groundwater available for the group.] 
 
This was the last year and the activity is now ended. We will gather your decision forms and 
hand you a short survey to be filled out. We will go over the survey with you. Thank you for 
providing this very valuable information. 
 
[Only in the communities that are to be paid individual earnings, say:] 
Once your questionnaire is filled out, we will give you your payment. 
 
[MONITOR: Gather the participants’ Decision Forms. Store the forms in the correct envelope.] 
When the survey is done, we will shortly begin a community-wide discussion meeting about this 
activity, and it would be wonderful if you could join us all to talk about your experience and 
ideas from the activity.  We will not tell anyone about how each of you individually played, or 
what you (singular) decided, but we hope you will feel free to share your experiences and ideas 
on how this game might apply to groundwater management in this area.   
 
Thank you so much for you time and attention!   
 Sampling 
 
The primary unit for site selection are habitation units (in contrast to the higher level political 
unit, the panchayat.) 1 or more habitations compose a panchayat. There are on average 4 
panchayats within each watershed. FES has five watersheds in which it has field teams. 
However, only four watersheds have habitations that use bore wells, a necessary contextual 
feature for the project. The participants need to use groundwater in their agricultural practices, 
which necessitates bore wells. 
 
In these 4 watersheds, there are 17 habitations available for running the field experiments or 
control. To expand the number of field sites for the study, we contacted Jana Jagriti, a partner 
NGO, to invite them to participate in the project. They have 3 watersheds available to bring the 
total number of villages to 30 project sites. We will end up with 29 project sites because we used 
one of the available FES sites as a pilot test. 
 
With 29 sites, we will divide the sites into unequal thirds for the two treatments and the control 
group: 10-10-9 (“earnings”-“flat-fee to community”-“control”). 
 
Sampling strategy: 
 NGO staff will go to the community in advance tell the Watershed Committee about 
plans to do the games (or the surveys in the control sites). The Watershed Committee will 
be asked to select 7 women and 7 men from different households that use groundwater 
(no couples from same household), with a request that they select households with a 
range of holding sizes.  Explain that we want to have a discussion and activity related to 
groundwater use, and we would like to invite men and women from households that uses 
groundwater to come to the meeting at X time.  Those who participate would spend 
approximately 2 1/2  hours, but it is a rather fun activity and [depending on the type of 
community] we will make a donation to the community fund to recognize their 
participation OR they will have a chance to make some money—between 200 and 500 
rupees.  Ask the committee to select 7 each men and women, but explain that on the day 
of the game, only 5 of each will be needed.   
 From those who show up, separate them into men and women.  Put 5 slips of paper 
numbered 1 through 5 into a bowl, along with blank slips, and let each person draw a slip.  
Those with a numbered slip would play. 
 Before the rest leave, check that no couples were slected (man and woman from the same 
house).  If they were, let them “draw straws” or something else to randomly select which 
one plays.  The other goes home, and is replaced by another man or woman.   
  
 
When invited, the participant needs to understand that approximately 2 1/2 hours will be 
required to participate (from being seated, through the exercises, discussion, and survey, to the 
end of the community debriefing.) If the person declines to participate, the recruiters move on to 





Each field site will consist of two groups of five participants each. One group will consist of men 
only and the second group will consist of women. The gender-segregated sessions will ensure 
each group is willing and able to speak freely about the exercise and its relevance to their lives. 
 
The goal is to complete a site in a single visit. Group sessions are held sequentially. The 
Community Debriefing is scheduled for later in the day or evening, when the entire village will 
be available to meet. 
 
Upon arriving at a village to begin the group sessions, a brief introduction is read to the village: 
 
Thank you for allowing us to visit your community today.  Before we get started, we want to 
briefly explain why we are here.  As you are aware, groundwater depletion is major problem in 
this area and we are seeing increasing incidence of crop failures due to unavailability of water. 
Watershed activities being undertaken aim to address the availability of water from both demand 
and supply side. Today we are here for an activity which is part of a research project.  This 
research is being undertaken in collaboration with International Food and Policy Research 
Institute and Arizona State University. We have requested the watershed committee to select 5 
men and 5 women from your community to participate in a series of small activities. These 
activities are designed to allow us to learn a little about your community and your farming 
situation. This will be followed by a village Gram Sabha where the selected participants will 
share their experience and we will discuss on the probable options to address groundwater 
management.  
 
Although we would love to have everyone join us in these activities today, we are only able to 
work with the ten people already invited. We need to begin our work, and we ask the first group 
of (Men/Women) to join us in the meeting area. We ask the other group to leave for a while and 
come back later when we can meet with you. Everyone else, you are welcome to watch us, but 











The Facilitator reads the instructions and answers questions about the exercise. He or she also 
updates the Water Level indicator on the pin board when announcing the new water levels after 
the crop decisions. 
 
The Monitor records the crop decisions selected by the participants, and he writes their income 
on their Decision Forms. The Monitor also makes sure that the participants follow the rules (do 
not talk when not permitted, are not looking at each other’s forms, etc.) 
 
The Recorder writes down what participants talk about during discussion periods, using the 
Discussion Topic Instrument. They note who says what and notes any interesting discussions 
relevant to the history of the habitation. The Recorder also takes notes during the Community 
Debriefing. 
 
When calculating the total number of trained staff required for the project, additional staff should 
be fully trained as redundant backups in case any of the primary staff become unavailable (due to 
sickness, family emergency, etc.) 
 
In all sites, an FES hydrology team member will be the Facilitator. In the FES watersheds, the 
Recorder will be an FES field staff person, familiar with the habitation. In the Jana Jagriti 
watersheds, one of the JJ staff will fill the role of Recorder. 
 
In the Individual Payment villages, following the end of the two games, earnings are calculated 
and a Payment Voucher is filled out and given to each Participant, indicating how much they will 
receive after they have filled out the Survey. In the Flat-Fee villages, the participant id number is 
given to the participant, to hold onto until they complete the survey. 
 
The surveys are completed after the experiment sessions, during the break period before the 
Community Debriefing. Each field staff person sits with a participant and assists them with 
completing the survey. The Payment Voucher/Participant ID is used to ensure the survey is 
completed and marked with the correct Participant ID number. In the Individual Payment 




There are two treatments, plus a control group. In the two treatments, all sites will participate in 
the same set of activities: An initial exercise without any communication, followed by a 
discussion period facilitated but not dictated by the Facilitator, and concluded with a second 
exercise that includes a 45-second discussion period between each round. Following the 
exercises, the participants will complete a survey and then be paid according to the assigned 
treatment. 
 
In Treatment (A), the individual participants will be paid a fee according to their earnings in the 
two exercises. Each unit of income in the exercises will be worth 5 rupees. According to that 
figure, the minimum payment a participant can receive is 200 rupees (Choosing Crop A every 
round: 2 units x 20 rounds = 40 units x 5 rupees = 200 rupees), and the theoretical maximum that 
can be earned by an individual is 500 rupees (Choosing Crop B every round: 5 units x 20 rounds 
= 100 units x 5 rupees = 500 rupees). Because every participant is guaranteed a minimum 
payment of 200 rupees, no show-up fee is needed. 
 
In Treatment (B), the community will be paid a flat fee for participating in the study. 
Documents & Forms: 
 
In addition to the Checklist and this master Protocol document, additional forms need to be 
completed and translated into the needed site languages. 
 
1. Consent Letter – All participants must read or have the Consent Letter read to them, so 
that we know they fully understand the meaning in the letter and so they can give their 
informed consent to participate in the project. THIS IS CRITICAL. IT CANNOT BE 
SKIPPED, OR GLOSSED OVER QUICKLY. Each participant must either sign a copy 
of the letter or their verbal consent must be recorded on the letter by a project staff 
person. 
2. Signup/Payment Form – The name of each participant must be recorded into the signup 
sheet. At the end of the session, after each participant has completed their survey, they 
must sign that they have received the payment allotted for their project treatment. 
3. Scripts - The session facilitators will need a concise script or bullet-point list of things to 
say every session. It is very important that the same things are said every time (and said 
the same way) and nothing is accidentally left out or added. 
4. Participant ID Tags – Numbered slips 1-5 in plastic conference badges on lanyards, to 
make sure staff don’t mix up participant positions. The participants wear the id around 
their necks for the session. 
5. Monitor Forms – Two forms are needed for each group, one for each exercise (1 and 2). 
Ideally, the forms would be printed double-sided, so exercise 1 would be on one side, and 
exercise 2 on side two. Alternately, if double-sided printing is not possible, at time of 
printing each form pair should be stapled together. These forms need to be labeled 
correctly for the watershed, village, habitation, group, name of habitation (Location), and 
date and time, and game number (1 or 2). The watersheds, villages, and habitations need 
to be coded with numbers prior to the start of the project. 
6. Decision Forms – The forms used by participants for recording their crop decisions each 
round and for the monitor to write their round earnings. Each participant will use two 
forms, one for each exercise. 
7. Discussion Topic Journal – This is the form used by the Recorder to note what topics 
are discussed by the group during the discussion session. Who speaks and what they say 
should be noted. 
8. Survey Instrument 
9. Community Debriefing Protocol 
10. Habitation Attributes Instrument – It may be very useful to use a standardized form 
for capturing the attributes of the habitation study sites currently recorded in FES’ village 
records. The document included in the Dropbox folder is an example based off an 
attributes instrument from another study, which provides some example attributes that 
may be very useful (with tweaking.)  
 
Wrapping up Site Visit and Data Collection: 
 
The Facilitator is responsible for collecting and securely storing all experiment forms. Double-
check that all the forms have been completed fully and correctly: Session details are completed: 
Date, time, Watershed, Village, Habitation Unit, and Group number. It is critical that all this 
information is filled out correctly on all the forms. Also make sure that the surveys are 
completed, and no questions are skipped (whenever possible.) 
 
At the end of the day, the field staff should sit down and discuss the session. Record the team’s 
observations in a journal: Did anything unusual happen? Did something go wrong or differently 
than usual? All of these details are useful, and when problems or surprises occur, it is very 
important to record that so they can be accounted for when analyzing the data.  
1A. Consent Letter: Individual Payments (Treatment A) 
CONSENT FORM 
 
Watershed No.: _____ Village No.: ______  HU No.: ______ 
 
Group No.: ______   Participant No.: _____ 
 
 
Place and Date: ___________________ Time of the activity: ___:___ AM/PM 
 
You have been invited to participate in an activity that is part of a research project about the 
management of natural resources, especially groundwater irrigation. Due to your experience with 
groundwater irrigation, your participation is very important for this research. The exercises and 
discussions will provide important information for all of us, including your community. The 
funding for this project came from international organizations. 
 
The duration of the activity is three hours. There are no foreseeable risks for your participation.  
 
At the end of the activity, you will receive an amount of cash depending on your earnings during 
the activity. 
 
You will be participating in the exercise twice. In each exercise, you will earn income for your 
cash payment. Between the two exercises, you will have an opportunity to talk about your 
experience and thoughts of the exercise. 
 
After the activities are over, we will call you forward one by one to give you a voucher that shows 
you how much money you will receive. _____ (date/time), we will meet with you and ask that you 
answer some questions on a short questionnaire about yourself, your household, and your 
community. Your thoughts and answers to these questions will be very helpful to us. What you 
earned in the activity and your answers on the questionnaire will be confidential. This 
information will be used for academic purposes only. 
 
In addition to this activity you are invited to participate in a community discussion session to 
discuss the results of the activity. The discussion will be held in ________ at _________am/pm. 
 
Your participation in the activity is completely voluntary. You may leave the activity at any time, 
and you will receive what you earned up to that point. However, if you decide to leave before the 
activity is over, the activity also ends for the other group members. 
 
The cash payment that you earn during the activity will be given to you after you finish answering 
the questions on the survey. All decisions in the activity are made in private and we will keep your 
decisions confidential. However, we cannot control participants’ conversations about the activity 
after the activity is over. 
 
If you want a copy of this consent form, please ask us for it. 
  
1B. Consent Letter: Flat-Fee (Treatment B) 
CONSENT FORM 
 
Watershed No.: _____ Village No.: ______  HU No.: ______ 
 
Group No.: ______   Participant No.: _____ 
 
 
Place and Date: ___________________ Time of the activity: ___:___ AM/PM 
 
You have been invited to participate in an activity that is part of a research project about the 
management of natural resources, especially groundwater irrigation. Due to your experience with 
groundwater irrigation, your participation is very important for this research. The exercises and 
discussions will provide important information for all of us, including your community. The 
funding for this project came from international organizations. 
 
The duration of the activity is three hours. There are no foreseeable risks for your participation.  
 
Your community will be paid 2000 Rp. today as a thank you for everyone’s participation in today’s 
activities. 
 
You will be participating in the exercise twice. Between the two exercises, you will have an 
opportunity to talk about your experience and thoughts of the exercise. 
 
_____ (date/time), we will meet with you and ask that you answer some questions on a short 
questionnaire about yourself, your household, and your community. Your thoughts and answers to 
these questions will be very helpful to us.  Your decisions in the activity and your answers in the 
questionnaire will be confidential. This information will be used for academic purposes only. 
 
In addition to this activity you are invited to participate in a community discussion session to 
discuss the results of the activity. The discussion will be held in ________ at _________am/pm. 
 
Your participation in the activity is completely voluntary. You may leave the activity at any time.. 
However, if you decide to leave before the activity is over, the activity also ends for the other 
group members. 
 
All decisions in the activity are made in private and we will keep your decisions confidential. 
However, we cannot control participants’ conversations about the activity after the activity is over. 
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INDIVIDUAL SURVEY  
 
Staff Use Only 
Date (dd/mm/yy)      /     /       Time      :        Habitation Name            
 
Watershed        Village        Habitation        
 
Group   M/F Participant       Surveyor        
 
SECTION I. RESPONDENT CHARACTERISTICS 
Please answer for yourself 
 
1. How old are you?       years 
 
2. Sex  Male  Female 
 
3. Your Marital Status 
 1. Married   3. Divorced   5. Common law  
             /Cohabiting 
 2. Widowed   4. Separated  6. Single 
 
4. Your Caste  
OC 1  
OBC 2  
SC 3  
ST  4  
 
 
5. What is the highest grade you have completed in school?  
None 0  
Adult literacy class 1  
Primary school (1-5) 3  
Secondary school (6-10) 4  
Intermediate (11-12)   
Technical School 5  
University 6  
 
6. How long have you lived in this habitation?       YEARS 
 
7. Who will work on your farm five years from now?  
You 1  
Child 2  
Other Relative 3  
Hired Labor  4  
Land Sold to Someone Else 5  
 8. Are you a member or leader of any community groups? 
 Member Leader 
Water Committee 1 9 
Water & Sanitation 
Committee 
2 10 
Panchayat 3 11 
Self-Help  4 12 
Forest Protection (VSS) 5 13 
Farmer’s Club 6 14 
Mother’s Committee 7 15 
Other: ____________ 8 16 
 
 
SECTION II. HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS 
Please answer for your entire household 
 
9. Number of people (adults and children) who lived in house during last year for at least six 
months 
 Male Female 
Adult             
Children (under age 16)             
 
 
10. How long has your family (ancestors) lived in this habitation?  
(For married women, answer for your husband’s family) 
 
< 4 Years 1  
5 – 10 Years 2  
11 – 20 Years 3  
21 – 50 Years  4  
> 50 Years 5  
 
11. What are the sources of livelihoods for your household and which are the three most 
important (please rank in order 1, 2, 3)? 
  Rank 
Irrigated Farming 1       
Rain-Fed Farming 2       
Animal Husbandry 3       
Farm Wage Labor  4       
Off-Farm Wage Labor 5       
Business 6       
Salaried Employment 7       
Remittances, Pensions 8       
Other 9       
If Other, please write that livelihood:                 
12. Do you own or rent: 
 Own Rent 
Bicycle 1  
Motorcycle 2  
Car 3  
Tractor/Harvester 4  
Cell Phone 5  
Television 6  
Pakka House 7 9 
Kacha House 8 10 
 
13. If you have a cell-phone, how many people in your habitation have you put into your cell 
phone address book?  
 
No One 0  
Very Few 1  
About Half 2  
More Than Half  3  
Almost Everyone 4  
 
SECTION III. COLLECTIVE ACTION 
 
14. Please tell me whether in general you agree or disagree with the following statements:  
             
Please check the most appropriate response A, B, C or D. 
A = Agree Strongly 
B = Agree Somewhat  
C = Disagree Somewhat  
D = Disagree Strongly 
 A B C D 
1. Most people in this community are basically honest and can 
be trusted.     
2. People are always interested only in their own welfare.     
3. In this community, one has to be alert or someone is likely 
to take advantage of you.     
4. I do not pay attention to the opinions of others in the 
community.     
5. Most people in this community are willing to help if you 
need it.     
6. I feel accepted as a member of this community.     
7. If a mother in this village has an emergency and needs to 
leave her baby for the day, she will easily find someone in 
this village she can trust with her baby 
    
8. If someone loses a pig, goat or chicken he or she will easily 
find others in this village to help to seek and find it.     
9. If a neighbor in this village lends some money to another 
neighbor, it is very likely that the lender gets her money 
back 
    
 
15. Think about the people that live in this village. If you had a newly born baby, in how many 
houses would you be able to leave your baby and trust them in case you had to leave for the day 
because of an emergency? 
 
No One 0  
Very Few 1  
About Half 2  
More Than Half  3  
Almost Everyone 4  
 
 
16. If you had to borrow a small amount of money for an emergency, from how many of your 
neighbors would you be able to get the money with no interest? 
 
No One 0  
Very Few 1  
About Half 2  
More Than Half  3  
Almost Everyone 4  
 
 
17. How much influence do you think you and people like you can have in making this village a 
better place to live?  
 
A Lot 3  
Some 2  
Not Much 1  
None  0  
Don’t Know/Unsure -1  
 
18. Suppose that 10 of your neighbors are invited to help in community activities. How many 
would show up?  
 
      Neighbors
Section IV. Land & Water use 
 
19. Last year, how much land did your household have and how was it watered: 
 Acres 
Land Owned       
Land Leased In       
Land Leased Out       
  
Total Land That Can Be 
Cultivated 
      
Tank Irrigated       
Bore Well Irrigated       
Open Well Irrigated       
Land Fallow       
 
20. Who owns the bore well that you use to irrigate your crops? (Check One) 
 
My Household 1  
Shared With Relatives 2  
Shared with non-Relatives 3  
Purchased Water  4  
 
21. If you use water from an open well to irrigate your crops, who owns the open well? (Check 
One) 
 
My Household 1  
Shared With Relatives 2  
Shared with non-Relatives 3  
Purchased Water  4  
 
22. What kind of crops did you grow last year? 
 










                               
                               
                               
                               
                               
Rabi Season 
                               
                               
                               
                               
                               
Summer Season 
                               
                               
                               
                               
                               
 
23. How much did you pay last year? 
 
Water Purchased       




24. Over the last ten years, do you think the water table 
Has Fallen -1  
Is Unchanged 0  
Has Risen 1  
 










9. Community Debriefing Protocol 
 
The debriefing session will be held immediately following the conclusion of the Experiment 
sessions. By holding two simultaneous sessions, Men and Women groups, followed by the 
Community Debriefing, hopefully it will be possible to include all or most of the experiment 
participants in the debriefing with the experience and lessons fresh on everyone's minds. If it is 
necessary to schedule the Debriefing at a different time, it should be set for a time recent enough 
to the experiment for the participants to have fresh memory of the experience. The Debriefing is 
open to the entire community; ensure during the scheduling and setup for the field visit that the 
local contacts in the community advertise clearly that everyone from the community is welcome 
to join this session. 
 
Open the session, explaining that the staff will not reveal the actions taken by any individuals in 
the games, but during the debriefing, the participants are free to share or keep private their own 
actions in the game, they are free to share what they are comfortable sharing. 
 
There are several main points each debriefing session should cover in all communities, but 
beyond these general points, allow the community to drive the discussion. Allow the session to 
go where it needs to for the community. 
 
1. Tell everyone: This is a fun activity to create dialog between them, academics and policy 
makers about a subject that they all care about. We use games because we want to understand 
how people make decisions. [With villages where we give cash payments: We use money 
because we want to study the decision-making process with real consequence for their pockets, 
just like in reality.] 
 
2. Give a brief presentation about the game. Most debriefing participants won't be familiar with 
the game, so explain the game, similar to how the game was presented during the experiment.  
(We should be able to reuse the posters used for the games: Water/Payoff for Crop A vs. B; 
Results planting AAAAA vs. BBBBB). 
 
2. Show the decisions that will lead to the most earnings (AAAAA) and the effect on available 
water, and the decisions that will lead to the least earnings (BBBBB) and its effect on water 
level.  DON’T: use any language that implies one is worse or wrong. We DO NOT judge one 
option against the other; just describe the effects neutrally. (Reuse the poster that shows the 
difference between Planting AAAAA vs BBBBB.) 
 
3. Show the results of the games, describe the general averages (NO SPECIFIC ABOUT 
INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPANTS).  If a whiteboard is available, the general averages could be 
drawn as lines or bars on a picture. Alternatively, it may be easier to print a large poster to point 
at the different levels.  Show the amount of Crop A and Crop B planted, on average, by each 
group. State how much each group earned. 
 
4. Begin open discussion with community. Ask them questions to jump-start the discussion, but 
let the community members to talk freely, particularly the game participants: 
 
- What happened during the first game (first 10 rounds)? What do you think was happening? 
What were you thinking? 
- What did you talk about during the discussion between games? 
- What happened during the second game? 
- Was there a difference; why do you think that happened? Were you surprised by anything 
that happened? Why or why not? 
- Was there a difference between the groups? If so, why was there a difference? 
- "What did you think about when making your decisions?" 
- Does this game relate to your situation? What are differences that you think are important?  
- Are there different kinds of crops that you have to choose between that require different 
amounts of water? How do you decide which to grow? What is important to you when you 
decide what crops to plant? 
- Are groundwater levels falling, rising, or steady in this community?  (refer to the 
groundwater records of the watershed committee, if available) 
- Do you think that groundwater levels are a problem? Do you think it will be a problem in 
the future?   
- Does what you do affect water available for others (or does what others are doing affect 
the water you have available?) 
- Does the game give you any ideas about your situation? Do you have any suggestions? 
 
DOS & DONTS 
 
 DO: Get the community’s trust that you will not show anyone the individual data, their 
decisions. The Facilitator is responsible for collecting all the experiment forms and storing 
them securely in a backpack. Make a fuss in the community discussion that all the forms 
are safe in your backpack and no one can look at it. 
 
 DO: Allow participants to discuss and share their thoughts and opinions. The debriefing 
must be a comfortable environment for the community--those who participated in the 
games AND those who did not--to talk freely about the games. 
 
 DO: Balance the community discussion between the “loud and extroverted” talkers and the 
shy, quiet members. Make sure no one is monopolizing the truth. 
 
 DONT: Reveal how any individual acted in the game. Do not show any individual results.  
 
 DONT: Tell the community that we are expecting/hoping to see them change their water-
use because of the game. We are watching and learning from them. 
 
 DONT: Tell the community that we are continuing to measure their water in order to test 
the effects of the games.  
 
 DONT: Tell them what they SHOULD DO or MUST DO. DONT tell them how they 
should play the game to make more money or save water. They must come up with their 
own ideas and suggestions, if they feel like it. We record what they say and the ideas that 
they come up with.  
 Appendix 2.  Supplemental Statistics 




















A 1 1 1 193 1250 15 FES 6 
A 1 1 2 14 95 4 FES 6 
C 1 1 3 30 220 6 FES 6 
B 1 1 4 33 165 1 FES 6 
A 2 1 5 33 100 2 FES 6 
B 2 1 6 31 48 0 FES 6 
B 2 1 7 100 210 9 FES 6 
C 2 1 8 64 110 10 FES 6 
C 2 1 9 28 250 4 FES 6 
A 2 1 10 19 250 5 FES 6 
C 3 1 11 66 640 6 FES 6 
B 3 1 12 107 896 67 FES 6 
B 4 2 13 114 560 9 FES 6 
A 4 2 14 30 125 4 FES 6 
C 4 2 15 52 25 0 FES 6 
A 4 2 16 250 550 16 FES 6 
C 5 3 17 68 70 13 JJ 20 
B 5 3 18 95 80 10 JJ 20 
A 5 3 19 27 120 19 JJ 20 
B 5 3 20 22 70 14 JJ 20 
C 6 4 21 82 125 14 JJ 19 
B 6 4 22 54 30 6 JJ 19 
C 6 4 23 54 24 4 JJ 20 
A 6 4 24 43 32 9 JJ 19 
A 6 4 25 65 22 5 JJ 20 
C 7 4 26 92 130 11 JJ 19 
A 7 4 27 61 92 11 JJ 20 
B 7 4 28 94 140 14 JJ 19 
Treatments: A = Individual Payments, B = Flat Fee, C = Control 
  
Table A2.2 Summary Statistics 
Variable Observations1 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Water use 3100 1.664 0.950 0 3 
Years in program 3400 11.588 6.688 6 20 
Communication 3400 1.502 0.500 1 2 
Available water 3100 33.287 9.960 16 50 
Female 3400 0.498 0.500 0 1 
Age 3380 38.500 12.872 20 86 
Caste 3380 3.224 0.870 1 4 
Education 3380 2.024 1.511 0 6 
Household size 3360 4.805 2.126 2 12 
Area owned 3380 2.105 1.396 0 10 
Area tank- irrigated 3240 0.131 0.267 0 1.6 
Area groundwater irrigated 3400 0.630 0.618 0 4 
      
1 Observations refer to number of participants times number of decisions.   
  














4 1 1.47 1.47 
5 2 2.94 4.41 
6 1 1.47 5.88 
7 6 8.82 14.71 
8 8 11.76 26.47 
9 6 8.82 35.29 
10 44 64.71 100.00 
Total 68 100.00  
 
